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INTRODUCTION 
 
Solomon grew wise by listening to his queens, proclaims the Irish poet 
William Butler Yeats.1 Wise professors also learn from their students. From 
no student have I learned more in my 30 years of teaching than from 
Professor Jiunn-rong Yeh. Yeh is truly a national treasure of Taiwan and a 
thought leader in several fields worldwide. 
Here in Taiwan, crossroads of the old and new, one sees how small the 
world has become, truly a “global village.”2 The reason, of course, is that 
now we share information instantly.3 As a result, culture develops on a 
transnational basis, in law as well as other areas, while hopefully still 
respecting some of the best of our own national histories and cultures. A few 
weeks ago, my wife and I attended a performance of the Cloud Gate Dance 
Theatre of Taiwan at the Kennedy Center in Washington, D.C.4 The Dean’s 
Distinguished Lecture this year at Yale Law School, my law school, was on 
“The Development of the Rule of Law in Taiwan (and its Implications for 
the Mainland)” by Professor Jerry Cohen from Harvard Law School.5 In that 
same spirit of sharing, I want to reflect on what we do well and not so well 
in environmental law in the United States. 
 
I. “THE THIRD MOVER ADVANTAGE” IN LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
American culture is very critical, both of ourselves and of others. We 
sometimes overlook our successes in our effort to use law and regulation to 
better manage the relationship between human beings and the natural 
environment and focus exclusively on our continuing challenges, which are 
also many. But we have definitely made progress, while there is also still 
much left to be done. Acrid smoke from automobile pollution was 
sometimes so bad in our capital city of Washington, D.C. when I first lived 
there in 1965 that one could not see across the street to the buildings on the 
other side. That is not the case today; the air is bright and clear. We also 
                                                                                                                            
 1. WILLIAMS BUTLER YEATS, On Woman, in THE WILD SWANS AT COOLE lines 9-12 (1919), 
available at http://www.bartleby.com/148/17.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (“Though pedantry 
denies,/It’s plain the Bible means/That Solomon grew wise/While talking with his queens.” No one 
grows wise while “talking,” so it is plain that the poet means listening during conversation). 
 2. The term is usually attributed to Marshall McLuhan, see Wikipedia, Global village (term), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_village_(term) (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (“Global Village is a 
term closely associated with Marshall McLuhan”) (as of Sept. 05, 2010, 08:14 GMT). 
 3. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, LETTERS OF MARSHALL MCLUHAN 254 (1987). 
 4. Sarah Kaufman, Dance Review: Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan at the Kennedy Center, 
Ancient Wisdom and a New Dance Direction, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2010, at C3, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/31/AR2010013101553.html (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2010) 
 5. Jerome A. Cohen, Dean’s Distinguished Lecture Series—Jerome Cohen ‘55 Speaks on Law 
and Life in Asia, http://www.law.yale.edu/news/11086.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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experienced a famous event in which one of our rivers caught fire; the 
Cuyahoga River in Cleveland caught on fire from a chemical sheen on top of 
the water, an event immortalized by Randy Newman in a popular song.6 
This event, among others, crystallized a shared recognition about 1970 that 
we had to clean up our environment and change the way that we relate to it 
forever. 
In the last generation, we have made some progress through 
environmental law in the United States in some areas. I come humbly to 
share with you some of our experience, both what has worked well in the 
United States and what has not worked so well. I offer these lessons not in 
the spirit that we have all the answers, but rather in the spirit of my first 
international legal conference in 1986.7 Liability law professors from all of 
the German-speaking nations had gathered to discuss the then-recent concept 
developed by the California Supreme Court of market share liability.8 One 
of the German representatives said “Yes, Elliott, we want you to come talk 
with us about this new American concept of market share liability so that we 
Germans can correct your mistakes and do it right.” His Swiss colleague 
then responded, “Yes, we Swiss will wait until both you Americans and you 
Germans have done this first and then we will really do it right!” 
Legal systems borrow and learn from one another, and “the race does 
not always go to the swift,”9 as we say in English. There is in a process in 
legal development that I will call “The Third Mover’s Advantage.” This is 
the opposite of the First-Mover Advantage in economic markets. 10  In 
business, sometimes a company that develops an innovation first gets an 
advantage in capturing a loyal following and establishing a dominant place 
in the marketplace that is difficult for later entrants to overcome.11 With 
legal systems, it is often just the opposite: later entrants have an enhanced 
opportunity to learn from the experience of those who went before. That is 
                                                                                                                            
 6 . Randy Newman, Lyrics of Burn On, available at http://www.lyricsdepot.com/randy- 
newman/burn-on.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (“Burn on, big river, burn on.”). 
 7. E. Donald Elliott, Torts with Multiple Causes Under U.S. Law, in 138 ARBEITEN ZUR 
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG [WORKS OF COMPARATIVE LAW] 9 (Fenyves & Weyers eds., 1987). 
 8. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
 9 . Inspirational Quotes on Running and the greatest Game of All-Life, http://www. 
pleasval.k12.ia.us/highschool/teachers/hoffmanjoshua/running_quotes.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 
2010). 
 10. Wikipedia, First-mover advantage, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-mover_advantage (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2010) (“First-mover advantage or FMA is the advantage gained by the initial 
occupant of a market segment.”) (as of June 09, 2010, 23:30 GMT). 
 11. This doesn’t always happen, of course. For example, the Taiwanese company Acer is winning 
increasing market share although they did not invent the personal computer. This is sometimes called 
“second mover advantage,” see id. As that term is already taken, I call my point about law “Third 
Mover Advantage,” following the comments from my Swiss colleague about the Swiss legal strategy 
quoted in the text above. 
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because many legal systems, including ours, find it relatively difficult to 
reconsider what has already been established. Or as I put it recently, we 
generally do not amend laws in the United States as long as they are working 
“tolerably badly.”12 They do not have to work well; they just have to be 
functioning well enough they are not intolerable. A closely related 
phenomenon was well-known in the 19th century as “survivals,” the 
tendency of features of law to continue long after the conditions that gave 
them birth had changed.13 As a result, a legal system that does it right the 
first time based on the prior experience of others is often at an advantage 
over the pioneers who try something early but are stuck with the results and 
find it hard to make mid-course corrections in the light of experience. 
I offer a few lessons from our experience in environmental law in the 
United States for whatever value they may have. I first describe five things 
that I think are among the best features of American environmental law and 
then the five worst. These are not necessarily the most important from other 
perspectives, but ones from which I think that other legal systems might 
benefit from our experience. 
 
II. FIVE THINGS WE DO RELATIVELY WELL IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
1. Verifiable and Enforceable Facility-Based Standards. The first 
positive thing that we do right is that we have a regulatory system for 
developing ex ante specific, objective, auditable, and verifiable standards for 
environmental compliance at the facility level in advance of a dispute or 
enforcement proceeding. These typically include not only specific emission 
limits but also very specific protocols for how compliance is to be tested and 
verified.14 In my classes, I sometimes call this law at the retail rather than 
the wholesale level. I understand that you do the same thing. 
Developing objective facility-specific requirements is the crucial feature 
that distinguishes those environment law systems that are effective, 
enforceable and can really work to change behavior from those which are 
merely window-dressing. In many systems around the world, environmental 
law consists merely of a high level declaration that one may not pollute, or 
may not pollute unreasonably. But in those systems, the command of the 
                                                                                                                            
 12. E. Donald Elliott, Portage Strategies for Adapting Environmental Law and Policy During a 
Logjam Era, 17 NYU ENVT’L L.J. 24, 37 (2008). 
 13. See, e.g., ROBERT WATSON GORDON, THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 27 
(1992); E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 113 (1984). See also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) 
(proposing techniques for courts to address the problem of “statutorification”). 
 14 . U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Technology Transfer Network Emission 
Measurement Center, CFR Promulgated Test Methods, http://www.epa.gov/ttn/emc/promgate.html 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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sovereign to the governed (to paraphrase John Austin’s definition of law)15 
remains a generality or aspirational norm that is subject to interpretation in 
the eye of the beholder. It is not translated into facility-specific requirements 
until perhaps the government brings an enforcement lawsuit. Then, in the 
context of that particular case, one figures out after the fact (or ex post, as 
legal academics like to say) whether or not the behavior of that particular 
entity is or is not in compliance with the general commands of the law. 
A great deal of the expense and complexity of U.S. environmental law 
systems, like the systems in Germany, Japan, and also (I believe) in Taiwan, 
goes into developing a series of permits that translate hollow generalities 
into objective, enforceable facility-specific requirements. This process of 
developing detailed permits for individual polluters serves, as our Supreme 
Court explained, “to transform generally applicable effluent limitations and 
other standards ─ including those based on water quality ─ into the 
obligations (including a timetable for compliance) of the individual 
discharger.” 16  This process of translating high level goals into 
facility-specific requirement requires a lot of time, effort and “bureaucracy,” 
but I believe that the effort and expense to develop enforceable standards at 
the facility level is generally worth the cost in terms of increased 
effectiveness and enforceability. 
A few academics, mostly on the right, have argued that this whole 
strategy of detailed environmental regulations and permits is a mistake. 
Instead, they say, we need “simple rules for a complex world.”17 The 
essence of their argument is that human beings lack perfect foresight, and 
thus, we are more likely to get the result right in a particular case with the 
benefit of 20-20 hindsight, plus we do not need to spend the transaction costs 
in many instances that never become controversial. 
These arguments have some validity as far as they go, but by my lights, 
they under-value the importance of clear, specific rules stated in advance in 
promoting compliance and enforcement, at least in environmental law. In my 
view, Colin Diver had it exactly right in his 1983 article in the Yale Law 
Journal on the “Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules,” when he argued 
that there is potentially a trade-off between getting the result right in a 
particular instance and enforceability.18 Perhaps in theory the ideal “first 
                                                                                                                            
 15. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 21 (1832). In actuality, 
Austin’s concept of law is more nuanced than is captured in this oft-quoted slogan. See, e.g., Gerald B. 
Wetlaufer, Gunmen, Straw Men, and Indeterminacy: H. L. A. Hart, John Austin, and the Concept of 
Law, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1487 (1997). 
 16. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 204-205 (1976). 
 17. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). For a parallel 
argument that too much law in areas other than the environment is “choking” freedom and initiative in 
America, see generally PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS: LIBERATING AMERICA FROM 
TOO MUCH LAW (2009). 
 18. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983) 
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best solution” would be a system of property rights19 or Pigouvian taxes that 
would perfectly internalize the harms caused by pollution, but absent that, in 
a second-best world, it is better to have a system of enforceable 
administrative rules that actually move us in the right direction than a system 
that is perfect in theory but has little effect in practice. That is a major 
problem in many parts of the world where environmental laws are beautiful 
in theory but ignored in practice. 
The parts of our environmental laws that have worked best to change 
behavior such as the Clean Water Act and portions of the Clean Air Act 
require the facility itself to self-monitor and make available the results of its 
testing publicly. When I first went up to Yale in 1981, I organized an 
environmental clinic and we started bringing lawsuits against local 
companies that were violating their water pollution permits. We would 
simply go into the state agency, get their public “discharge monitoring 
reports” in which they had reported that they had been polluting above the 
legal limits that had been set for their facility, and bring a lawsuit and move 
for summary judgment and attorneys fees. Years later when I helped to write 
the enforcement provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, we 
modeled them on the Clean Water Act, which at the time we felt was our 
most effective statute in terms of monitoring and enforcement. 
In my judgment and experience, in order to change behavior, it is very 
important to put in place verifiable and enforceable facility-specific 
standards, and in most areas, we do that right.20 
2. Market-Based Cap and Trade Systems. A second positive point in 
our system is the idea of trading systems and market-based approaches. This 
is what Professor Yeh wrote his JSD dissertation for me about at Yale Law 
School in 1988. He did a comparative study of economic incentive systems 
to regulate environmental pollution worldwide.21 What I learned from him, 
as well as mentors such as Bruce Ackerman, Susan Rose-Ackerman and 
Richard Stewart, who were real pioneers in environmental trading systems,22 
                                                                                                                            
(transparency (understandability), accessibility (ease of application), and congruency with policy 
purposes as factors in determining optimal precision). 
 19. For an argument that property rights can and should replace regulation to protect the 
environment, see Terry Anderson & David Leal, Free Market Environmentalism: Hindsight and 
Foresight, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 (1998); GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT (Donald R. 
Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2002). For a less dogmatic version of the argument, see Carol Rose, 
Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 40 DUKE L.J. 1, 
38 (1991). 
 20. But see generally Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous 
Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (1998). 
 21. Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Second Generation of Environmental Regulation: The Economic 
Incentive Approach (1988) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School). 
 22. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, JAMES W. SAWYER, JR. & DALE W. 
HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974); Bruce A. Ackerman 
& Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985). 
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came in very handy for me a year or two later as I was involved in helping to 
design and implement the first large-scale application of a an environmental 
trading system to reduce pollution: the acid-rain trading program under Title 
IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.23 It has certainly been one of 
our most successful pollution control programs, and many think the single 
most successful. From 2000 to 2009, the acid rain trading program resulted 
in a 71% decrease in the rate of sulfur dioxide pollution and a total reduction 
of sulfur dioxide pollution by 5.7 million tons, with 100% compliance at a 
fraction of the cost for convention “command and control” regulation.24 I 
was privileged to serve as General Counsel of Environmental Protection 
Agency (hereinafter EPA) and participated in developing that legislation and 
in the first years of its implementation.25 It been a very successful program, 
and has achieving its goals at far less cost than had been anticipated. Many 
scholars and government leaders think that it should be the model for climate 
change regulation worldwide.26 I am not so sure about that, but the “cap and 
trade” system for acid rain in the United States clearly was a stunning 
success, which should be studied and emulated worldwide. But “cap and 
trade” cannot be used successfully everywhere, and so we also need to study 
and understand the conditions under which “cap and trade” works well and 
where it does not.27 
One element of the acid rain trading system that the United States did 
not do particularly well in implementing was the concept of “Opting In.” 
This was built into the original legislation, but was never implemented.28 
The acid rain trading program was limited in the first instance to “electric 
generating units” (EGUs), i.e. utility power plants to produce electricity. 
                                                                                                                            
 23. Acid Deposition Control, Title IV of Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 97 (6th ed. 2009) (“The Clean Air Amendments of 1990 
provide the first large-scale experiment with emissions trading approaches long advocated by 
economists as a more efficient means for reducing pollution.”). For a general description of how the 
program works, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain Program SO2 Allowances Fact 
Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/trading/factsheet.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
 24. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Clean Air Markets, 2009 Emission, Compliance, 
and Market Analyses, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/progress/ARP09_2.html (last visited Sept. 10, 
2010). 
 25. For some lessons learned, see E. Donald Elliott, Lessons from Implementing the 1990 CAA 
Amendments, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10592 (2010). 
 26. Jonathan B. Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 
108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999).  
 27. E. Donald Elliott & Gail Charnley, Toward Bigger Bubbles: Why Inter-pollutant and 
Inter-risk Trading Are Good Ideas and How We Get There from Here, F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. 
POL’Y, winter 1998, at 48. 
 28. For information of Acid Rain Program Opt-In Rules of U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (Sept. 16, 1993) which promised that rules for “process sources” would be forthcoming at a 
later date but were never promulgated, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Register 
Notices for Acid Deposition (Title IV)—Proposed and Final Preambles and Rules, http://www. 
epa.gov/ttn/caaa/t4pfpr.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
2010]  151 U.S. Environmental Law in Global Perspective: Five Do’s and Five Don’ts from Our Experience 
However, I was well-aware from my prior experience in practice that there 
were some industrial sources, such as smelters, that could reduce their 
emissions of sulfur dioxide at a fraction of the cost to get equivalent 
reductions from EGUs. On the first day after my confirmation, I was over at 
the White House arguing that we ought to cover some industrial process 
sources as well, because we could get equivalent reductions at less expense. 
(I have long been a proponent of what I call “bigger bubbles,” making the 
trading system as broad as feasible.)29 The outcome was to allow industrial 
and other exempted process sources to voluntarily “opt in” to the acid rain 
trading system by choosing to become a “covered source” subject to all of 
the requirements of the program.30 
In the same way that the absence of entry barriers creates “potential 
competition” that can discipline market prices in anti-trust law,31 so too it is 
not always necessary to subject a pollution source to mandatory regulation in 
order to affect its behavior. One can think of this as “virtual regulation,” in 
which the behavior of parties outside the mandatory regulatory system is 
nonetheless affected by the incentives emanating from inside the regulatory 
structure. The “opt in” program created a positive incentive (what we call a 
“carrot” as opposed to a “stick”) for industrial sources to install existing 
technology, and/or to develop new technology, to control their emissions in 
order to obtain acid rain “allowances” that they could sell on the open 
market. 
What is really important about trading systems is not just the static 
perspective that they achieve compliance at a lower cost than command and 
control, but that they create dynamic incentives for the development of better 
technologies.32 And they do that particularly well if you allow parties that 
are not currently regulated to come into the system. We were so focused on 
meeting the statutory deadlines that we failed to implement the opt-in rules, 
which were important from a policy perspective but did not have deadlines, 
and by my lights, that was a mistake.33 
                                                                                                                            
 29. Elliott & Charnley, supra note 27. 
 30. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 410(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2621 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7651i) (“The owner or operator of any unit that is not, nor will 
become, an affected unit under section 403(e), 404, or 405, or that is a process source under subsection 
(d), that emits sulfur dioxide, may elect to designate that unit or source to become an affected unit and 
to receive allowances under this title.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Robert E. Hall, Potential Competition, Limit Pricing, and Price Elevation from 
Exclusionary Conduct, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 433 (ABA Section of Antitrust 
Law ed., 2008). 
 32. E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE 
NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 170 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 
1997); Elliott & Charnley, supra note 27, at 48-54. 
 33. Elliott, supra note 25, at 10596 (“Because there was no deadline on the [opt-in] rule, it was 
never actually implemented. We never got it done, and it died a quiet death in the Clinton 
Administration, which did not view it as important. But I think that it could have been a very 
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3. Citizens Suits to Force Government to Keep its Promises. The 
third good thing that I think about in reflecting on our environmental law 
system are so-called “citizen suits” to force government agencies to follow 
the law and also to enforce pollution standards against polluters. 34  I 
mentioned that previously in terms of my environmental clinic for law 
students at Yale that brought water pollution cases against local polluters. 
The ability of any affected member of a citizen’s group to go to court, to an 
independent judiciary, to make the government live up to its obligations 
under the law, or to make a polluter comply with its obligations under the 
law, is one of the very best features of the American system. 
In the early 90s, I was on a U.S. delegation to meet with the recently 
independent countries in Eastern Europe at an environmental technology 
transfer center that the U.S. government had set up in Budapest.35 All of the 
newly free and independent countries ─ Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
then-Yugoslavia, Bulgaria─they all came to talk to us about environmental 
law. Environmental law was their second biggest concern after human rights. 
The one question that they all asked was how do we make the government 
enforce the law? We have these beautiful laws that require control of 
pollution, they said, but our problem is how to enforce them in practice. 
They say they wanted an independent way to force the big, powerful, 
formerly state-owned enterprises to abide by their environmental laws─but 
of course they did not want all those lawsuits like you have in America. We 
responded, “That’s really the only way that we know how to do it.” 
Subsequently, a number of those countries have decided to adopt the 
mechanism of citizen-state suits as a way of using the independence of the 
courts to make sure the government actually enforces the law. 
We have two different kinds of citizen-suits in the United States and 
they are both very important. One is enforcement against a polluting facility. 
If a factory or other polluting facility is violating its pollution limits, any 
                                                                                                                            
important transformative rule. The problem was that we were so obsessed with meeting the statutory 
deadlines that we did not always prioritize in terms of what was most important from the standpoint of 
policy.”). 
 34. For an excellent summary, see generally JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987).  
 35. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, William K. Reilly: Oral History Interview, 
http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/print/reilly.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (“With the 
waning of the Cold War, the global political situation changed fundamentally while I was at EPA. In 
my view, it accelerated a process that was already underway of opening up a whole new world to the 
Agency─a world that desperately needed the experience of EPA, which is preeminent in its field 
internationally, a world that needed help in setting priorities, in gaining a sense of direction, that 
needed also, frankly, to learn from American mistakes, particularly since many of the societies most in 
need of help don’t have the resources that the United States has. We tried to respond to that by making 
the Agency available to Eastern European countries, and former Soviet countries. We set up the 
Budapest Center, which was an EPA proposal that I made to the Cabinet and the President before he 
went to Hungary─later known as the Bush Center.”). 
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citizen who claims to be affected in the vicinity can give notice to the EPA, 
the State and the polluter. Then there is typically a 30 to 60 day period within 
which EPA or the State has a chance to bring an enforcement action, or the 
polluter has to correct the violation.36 If the EPA or the State does not bring 
an enforcement action against the facility, then the citizens can bring an 
enforcement action against the facility for a court injunction.37 And if they 
prevail, they are entitled to receive attorney’s fees. So that’s one type of 
citizens suit, to enforce existing law against a polluter. 
The other type, which is equally important, is a suit against the 
government─usually against the Environmental Protection Agency─to 
require that the Agency follow the law, and in particular to issue regulations 
that have been delayed past a statutory deadline. It is often very popular 
politically to pass a vague, general law declaring that there shall not be 
pollution. But then when the government actually gets around to 
implementing that type of vague, aspirational law against particular 
industries, powerful political interests can stand in the way.38 We sometimes 
find in the United States that agencies might be reluctant to implement or 
enforce the law even though they have the power to do because of the fear of 
political backlash. In response, the Congress eventually developed 
something that my colleague Bruce Ackerman at Yale named the “Agency 
Forcing Statute.”39 The basic idea is that Congress passes a law setting 
deadlines within which EPA is supposed to act and if EPA fails to 
promulgate rules in accordance with those deadlines, then any citizen could 
go to court and get a court order forcing the Agency to follow the law.40 So, 
there are two different kinds of citizen-suits. One for enforcing existing 
pollution standards, and perhaps equally important, a second one to make 
sure the government follows the law and does what it is supposed to do. 
                                                                                                                            
 36. An example is sec. 304(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9604a-1 (“any person may 
commence a civil action on his own behalf— (1) against any person . . . who is alleged to have 
violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of (A) 
an emission standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State 
with respect to such a standard or limitation . . . .”). 
 37. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 38. Compare Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal 
Environmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS, Fall 1991, at 330 (“Congress has spoken with two 
different voices to EPA. . . . Legislators demanded immediate action requiring a massive agency 
undertaking. At the same time, however, they never provided a remotely commensurate level of 
agency funding.”). 
 39. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS 
AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981). 
 40. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304a-2, 42 U.S.C. § 9607a-2 (1990) (“any person may commence a 
civil action on his own behalf . . . (2) against the [EPA] Administrator where there is alleged a failure 
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the 
Administrator . . . .); EDF v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986). 
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4. General Deterrence, or Liability as a Regulatory System. The 
fourth thing that I think we do well is to use liability as a backstop to our 
regulatory system. 
One of the central insights in American law was articulated by my 
teacher, and also Professor Yeh’s teacher, Guido Calabresi, now a judge of 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York. In his book, The Cost of 
Accidents, in 1970,41 Calabresi argued that a pattern of liability suits would 
not only award compensation but would also constitute a regulatory system 
that creates a system of incentives for a particular level of safety. What we 
typically think of as private law remedies would also have a public law 
effect in creating a regulatory system. 
The typical pattern of environmental regulation in the United States has 
two tiers: government regulation by administrative agencies, which 
preserves rather than pre-empts other older remedies, such as causes of 
action for nuisance, trespass and other forms of environmental liability.42 
Both tiers of regulation create important incentives. My wife and frequent 
co-author Gail Charnley and I have done empirical studies of the types of 
“due diligence” that companies do before they put products on the market.43 
What we find is that the threat of liability is often a more potent determinant 
of corporate behavior than is the government regulatory system.44 In some 
areas in which our regulatory system is inadequate or incomplete, the threat 
of private liability for damages serves as a kind of regulatory back-stop or 
safety net. Consider, for example, our Toxic Substances Control Act 
(hereinafter TSCA),45 which has been widely-criticized as antiquated and for 
setting too high an evidentiary burden on the government as a pre-condition 
for regulating.46 I myself have condemned the leading case setting a high 
                                                                                                                            
 41. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). 
 42. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988) (preserving state authority to 
regulate more stringently than federal law). This is typical of U.S. environmental law statutes and has 
generally been interpreted to preserve damage actions under state law. See Middlesex City Sewerage 
Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 18 n.27 (1981) (quoting Senate Report on the FWPCA 
Amendments of 1972: “It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any 
rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would 
remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971) (emphasis supplied)). 
 43. E. Donald Elliott & Gail Charnley, Private Product-Risk Assessment and the Role of 
Government, 23 JOHN LINER REV. 73 (2009). 
 44. An important difference between my approach and Calabresi’s is that I argue that defenses or 
safe harbors that permit a particular company to avoid liability imposed on its competitors is a more 
important determinant of behavior than the baseline of liability imposed on all competitors equally. Id. 
at 78; E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Defenses/Enforcing Standards: The Next Stage of the Tort 
Revolution?, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069 (1991). 
 45. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2003). 
 46 . Environmental Defense Fund, Chemicals Policy Reform, http://www.edf.org/page.cfm? 
tagID=12814 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (“Our nation’s main statute governing chemicals 
policy—the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)—is seriously flawed and needs fundamental 
reform.”); Richard A. Denison, Ten Essential Elements in TSCA Reform, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10020 
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burden of proof on the government before regulating a chemical47 as “a 
public policy and public health disaster that should be overturned by the 
Congress.”48 
But despite the very real problems with our chemicals regulatory system 
under TSCA, we have not done a lot worse than the Europeans by allowing 
hundreds of dangerous chemicals onto the market. A German law professor, 
Ortwin Renn, from the University of Stuttgart, and I have written a joint 
piece comparing the regulation of chemicals in the United States and in 
Europe. It has already been published in Europe49 and should be coming out 
shortly in the United States in a book called The Reality of Precaution to be 
published by Resources for the Future, comparing the actual degree of 
precaution in risk regulation in various fields in the United States and 
Europe, including chemicals.50 The “Precautionary Principle”51 is a very 
good advertising slogan by the Europeans, but when one studies the actual 
degree of protection built into environmental regulations in the European 
Union and the United States, they are not that different.52 That is really the 
theme of the book. In the area of chemicals, the reason that we have done as 
well as we have in the United States, despite the problems that we have 
regulating effectively under TSCA, is because our regulatory system is 
backed up the threat of liability, or what Calabresi called “general 
deterrence” (threat of liability) as opposed to “specific deterrence” 
(administrative or legislative regulation).53 
Even if agencies are not able to regulate chemicals in the United States 
based on as low an evidentiary threshold as in Europe, there are very few 
chemicals that have come on to the market in the United States, but not in 
Europe, or are regulated in one but not the other. In practice, the degree of 
                                                                                                                            
(2009); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Administrator Jackson Unveils New 
Administration Framework for Chemical Management Reform in the United States (Sept. 29, 2009), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d985312f6895893b852574ac005f1e40/d07993fdcf801c228 
5257640005d27a6!OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
 47. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 48. Legislation to Implement the POPs, PIC, and LRTAP POPs Agreements: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Environment and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th 
Cong. 120-21 (2006) (statement of E. Donald Elliott). 
 49. Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Precautionary Regulation of Chemicals in the US and EU, 
in PRECAUTIONARY RISK APPRAISAL AND MANAGEMENT: AN ORIENTATION FOR MEETING THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 248 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 2009). 
 50. THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
EUROPE (Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., forthcoming Oct. 2010).  
 51. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 final 
(Feb. 2, 2000), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52000 
DC0001:EN:HTML (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
 52. Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and 
Europe, 5 J. RISK RES. 317 (2002); Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on 
the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207 (2003).  
 53. CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 199-201. 
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precaution tends to be similar, despite the rhetoric that Europe regulates on a 
more precautionary basis than the United States. In my opinion, that 
similarity in outcome despite differences in regulatory approach is largely 
because of the potent threat of liability as a backstop to government 
regulation in the United States. 
To their credit, in 2004, the Europeans finally promulgated an 
environmental liability directive requiring the creation of stronger 
environmental liability systems in each of the member states as a second tier 
of regulation.54 Interestingly, the new European Environmental Liability 
Directive was not designed solely to compensate injuries; its declared 
purpose, which is part of its official title, is also the “prevention” of 
environmental damage: “On Environmental Liability with Regard to the 
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage” (emphasis 
supplied).55  The philosophy of using the threat of liability to prevent 
damage is also specifically endorsed in its text: “The fundamental principle 
of this Directive” is to hold operators liable “in order to induce operators to 
adopt measures and develop practices to minimise the risks of environmental 
damage so that their exposure to financial liabilities is reduced.” 56 
Elsewhere I have written that “the most effective kind of power is power that 
does not have to be used to be effective.”57 What a perfect example of that 
principle in action: a perceived and credible threat of liability for 
environmental damage can often be the most effective way of preventing 
environmental damage from occurring. This is the essence what of 
Judge/Professor Calabresi referred to as “general deterrence.”58 Its great 
advantage is that the threat of liability is always there, and does not require 
specific regulatory action by government as a pre-condition to affecting 
behavior.59 General liability signals are omnipresent and they are very 
important in our system as a general backstop to more specific regulatory 
actions. Europe is also moving in that direction but it is not as far along as 
the U.S. in using the tool of economic signals from the liability system to 
prevent environmental damage. In 2008 the European Commission went to 
court against nine member states for failing to implement the environmental 
                                                                                                                            
 54. Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 
2004 O.J. (L 143) 56-75, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
CELEX:32004L0035:EN:HTML (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
 55. Id. at 56. 
 56. Id., Whereas Clause 2. 
 57. E. Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1103 
(1985).  
 58. CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 199. 
 59. For a general account of the massive amounts of information that must be processed before 
government may act to protect the environment in the U.S., see E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law 
at a Crossroad, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
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liability directive in their domestic legal systems.60 
5. Quantitative Risk Assessment to Set Priorities. My final example 
of something that we do relatively well is the use of quantitative risk 
assessment61 to set priorities. This was not always the case. When I went to 
EPA in 1989, we did always set priorities systematically or target our scarce 
resources where they could produce the greatest benefit. The classic example 
is the banning of the pesticide Alar in 1989, which came in more or less 
direct reaction to a publicity campaign by the environmental group NRDC 
that featured the popular actress Meryl Streep and the television program 60 
Minutes.62 Activists on the right63 and the left64 still debate whether EPA 
made the right decision, but it was apparent to then-EPA Administrator 
William K. Reilly and most of his senior staff that determining the agency’s 
regulatory priorities in moments of “episodic panic”65 in reaction to press 
                                                                                                                            
 60. Press Release, European Union, Environment: Commission takes nine member states to 
Court over environmental liability (June 26, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/1025&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage 
=en (last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
 61. For a good introduction to basic risk assessment concepts, see Daniel Krewski, Risk 
Assessment, Risk Management, http://www.enotes.com/public-health-encyclopedia/risk-assessment- 
risk-management (last visited Sept. 10, 2010); a more extended explanation is provided by JOSEPH V. 
RODRICKS, CALCULATED RISKS: THE TOXICITY AND HUMAN HEALTH RISKS OF CHEMICALS IN OUR 
ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2007). 
 62. The basic facts, and the arguments pro and con, are well summarized in an article by Elliott 
Negin and a letter response by Elizabeth Whelan, both of which are available at The Alar “Scare” was 
for Real; and so is that “Veggie Hate-Crime” Movement, http://www.pbs.org/tradesecrets/docs/ 
alarscarenegin.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (“As conventional wisdom has it, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, a nonprofit environmental group, manipulated CBS’s 60 Minutes into 
hyping a story on the dangers of Alar, a chemical sprayed on apples to regulate their growth and 
enhance their color. The February 1989 broadcast, largely based on the NRDC report ‘Intolerable 
Risk: Pesticides in Our Children’s Food,’ told an audience of some 40 million that Alar was a 
dangerous carcinogen. Then, the tale continues, NRDC’s public relations firm, Fenton 
Communications, convinced other major news organizations to feature the story. Meryl Streep testified 
before Congress, and on TV talk shows, about Alar’s dangers. The public panicked: school systems 
removed apples from their cafeterias, supermarkets took them off their shelves, and orchard owners 
lost millions. The maker of Alar, Uniroyal Chemical Co., was ultimately forced to take it off the 
market, even though, the story goes, it posed no real health risk.”). Negin himself has been criticized 
for not disclosing an alleged affiliation with NRDC, see Leftist Takes Over Columbia Journalism 
Review, http://www.aim.org/media-monitor/leftist-takes-over-columbia-journalism-review/ (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2010). 
 63. Kenneth Smith & Jack Raso, An Unhappy Anniversary: The Alar “Scare” Ten Years Later, 
http://www.acsh.org/publications/pubid.865/pub_detail.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2010); Steven J. 
Milloy, Background on the Alar Controversy, http://www.junkscience.com/news3/alar.html (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
 64. Environmental Working Group, Myth of “Alar Scare” Persists: Ten Years Later, Myth of 
“Alar Scare” Persists, http://www.ewg.org/node/8005 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010); Negin, supra note 
62. 
 65 . The phase is Reilly’s. “What we have had in the United States is environmental 
agenda-setting by episodic panic,” says William K. Reilly, the former administrator of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency and head of the World Wildlife Fund. Panic Doesn’t Help The 
Environment, http://articles.courant.com/1993-04-05/news/0000103755_1_carbon-dioxide-panic-toxic 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2010). 
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reports was not the best way to set priorities on a systematic basis. 
One of the great accomplishments of William Reilly’s tenure at EPA was 
to win greater acceptance for the use of risk assessment to set priorities on a 
more systematic basis. The goal is to focus scarce resources where they 
could produce the greatest benefit. One cannot improve upon his telling of 
the story in his oral history of his tenure as EPA Administrator, so I will not 
try: 
 
“[T]he concept of risk assessment and then risk management, that 
is, of trying to determine a level of practical achievable control, 
gradually gained currency as a consequence of two things. First of 
all, the Agency dealt with many more problems than it used to, as a 
consequence of a whole plethora of legislation that was added to its 
responsibilities in the 1970s and 1980s─the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, the Resource Conservation Recovery Act, the 
Superfund Law. The result of this was to cause even the most 
idealistic and protective of EPA staff to realize, we can’t do it all. 
We have got . . . to make some allocation of our resources, given 
the fact that there’s more for us to do than we can do. . . . Secondly, 
the technology of detection advanced very significantly. Within a 
space of a few years, we went to the possibility of detecting not just 
parts per million but parts per billion and even in some areas, parts 
per quadrillion, as detectable, though admittedly trace, amounts of 
particular chemicals. . . . To the degree that we understand that there 
are trace amounts of carcinogens on our food from pesticides, or 
even in natural products like coffee or peanut butter, we ourselves 
have to acknowledge that we are making these choices and 
tradeoffs . . . . 
It certainly requires a more mature accommodation of reality. It also 
reminds us that some of these pollutants are facts of life. They are 
in the environment, many of them irrespective of human alteration 
and manipulation. . . . The ideal is to ensure through regulation that 
such inevitable risks are negligible, i.e., that they would not over a 
lifetime of anticipated exposure in a real world situation result in 
more than one excess cancer death in a million people. Zero risk is 
a chimera, a beckoning illusion. To try to achieve it would consume 
unjustifiable amounts of resources, and entail forgoing much 
progress. Tolerating a certain trace level of pollutant in certain 
circumstances, is more than offset by gains to health that you can 
get with the freed-up resources . . . . 
[Y]ou realize that in some instances you would be better able to 
protect society against a larger problem in gross if you didn’t 
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deploy a disproportionate amount of your resources on what is a 
much smaller problem, it causes you then to get into the realm of 
risk assessment and risk management.  
Risk assessment, I think, has gained currency as a consequence of a 
very large set of responsibilities that forced prioritization.”66 
 
E. O. Wilson has argued that most of the progress in human affairs since 
the Enlightenment that has come from people counting things.67 Sometimes 
there is great value in quantitative models and methods that can detect things 
that are hard to see with our ordinary senses. But quantitative models can 
also be abused if we try to carry them too far. In a recent comment in the 
Pennsylvania Law Review, I have argued that one cannot validly use cost 
benefit analysis and quantitative risk assessment to “fine tune” regulations─
that is, to determine that the regulatory limit should be 0.8 parts per million 
rather than 0.7 parts per million─because current data and cost/benefit 
techniques are just too crude and imprecise.68 They result in what has aptly 
been called “the tyranny of false precision,” in which they appear to provide 
more information than is really there, and thus can mislead decision-makers. 
But quantitative risk assessment can be extremely useful for comparing 
among various risk reduction opportunities and setting priorities. 
The government can often achieve much greater risk reduction benefits 
by investing its efforts in one area as opposed to another area. Based on my 
experience at EPA, and also the literature,69 there are often differences by 
four or five orders of magnitude─a factor of ten thousand or one hundred 
thousand─between the amount of safety that can be produced by investing 
in one area as opposed to investing in another. It is crucial not to look at 
government regulatory decisions about risk regulation one-by-one─as if 
they were criminal cases as to whether a particular chemical is guilty or 
                                                                                                                            
 66. Id. 
 67. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: ON THE UNITY OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE passim (1998) 
(“Reductionism and analytic mathematical modeling were destined to become the most powerful 
intellectual instruments of modern science” (p. 29); “Western science took the lead largely because it 
cultivated reductionism and physical law to expand the understanding of space and time beyond that 
obtainable by the unaided senses. […] They were conceived […] during a search for quantifiable 
truths […]” (p. 31); “The great merit of [mathematical] models […] is that they force investigators to 
provide unambiguous definitions […] as well as processes […] When well-conceived, a model leaves 
no doubt about its assumptions.” (p. 198)). 
 68. E. Donald Elliott, Response, Only a Poor Workman Blames His Tools: On Uses and Abuses 
of Benefit-Cost Analysis in Regulatory Decision Making About the Environment, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 178, 179 (2009), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/03-2009/Elliott. 
pdf. 
 69. The classic article is Tammy O. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of 
Haphazard Social Investments in Life-Savings, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER 
RESULTS FROM REGULATION 167 (R. W. Hahn ed., 1996). 
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innocent─implicitly analogizing to criminal cases.70 A better metaphor is 
that the government is making decisions to invest in improving safety in one 
area as opposed to another. The government has limited resources from 
society. Quantitative techniques are very useful in terms of comparing 
various investment opportunities and selecting what are the most promising 
potential opportunities for getting the greatest benefit. 
 
III. FIVE THINGS WE DO RELATIVELY POORLY IN U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Now we get to the fun part: the five things that we do that I recommend 
that you avoid. 
1. Higher Burden of Factual Proof on Government. The first, and 
perhaps the most important, is that we generally do place too high burden of 
proof of factual issues on the government as a pre-condition for regulation. 
That is a fundamental part of the American legal and political culture. The 
framers of our Constitution had lived under a king─under a totalitarian 
regime─and their primary fear in drafting our Constitution was to make sure 
that the government was incapable of over-regulating the people. Their 
concern was that the new federal government of the United States would 
become another totalitarian government like the king of England under 
whom they had lives, and so they went to great extent to build into our 
governmental structure a number of checks and balances against arbitrary 
exercises of governmental power. These principles at the constitutional level 
have carried on over into our legal culture so we set very high standards as a 
pre-condition for government regulation in many areas. One example is that 
a senior EPA official, Mike Shapiro, once said that 90% of the analysis is not 
necessary for the government to make a decision but to develop a record to 
support the decision on judicial review.  
A classic example the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision,71 reversing an 
EPA rule banning all uses of asbestos. EPA had promulgated a rule banning 
the most common uses of asbestos in the United States.72 That rule was 
invalidated by the court, however, when we returned to court despite the fact 
that we have 100,000 page record and 10,000 studies about the health risks 
of asbestos. So, sometimes there is a very substantial burden of factual proof 
on the agency before it may regulate. 
Many of the substantive standards of law in the United States are as 
precautionary as the standards in Europe. It is the procedural structure of 
judicial review within which these standards are embedded that makes it 
                                                                                                                            
 70. For criticism of the criminal model when regulating chemicals, see Denison, supra note 46. 
 71. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 72. Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions, 
54 Fed. Reg. 29, 460 (1989). 
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difficult to regulate on a precautionary basis in the United States.73 
2. Non-Expert Judicial Review of Scientific and Technical Decisions. 
This is a complimentary problem that goes hand in hand with the previous 
one. It is a really strange feature of the American legal system that we create 
expert agencies and then we make their decisions subject to review by courts 
of general jurisdiction, as opposed to specialized administrative courts like 
the Conseil d’Etat in France or the National Academy of Sciences, or other 
specialized courts that we have in the United States. Most of our federal 
judges are former state court trial judges with no special training or 
experience with environmental issues.74 Some courts, such as the D.C. 
Circuit, which reviews many rules of national consequence from EPA, do 
have judges who are experts in administrative law. But none of the current 
D.C. Circuit judges has a background in environmental law, or science. 
There are many decisions by our Supreme Court attempting to restrain 
lower courts and attempting to impose principles of deference to agency 
expertise on them. A classic example is the 1983 Baltimore Gas & Electric 
case in the Supreme Court. 75  It enunciated the principle that “when 
examining agency determinations at the frontiers of science . . . a reviewing 
court must generally be at its most deferential.”76 We have many principles 
in our law that review of decisions by administrative agency is supposed to 
be deferential. But deference is very difficult to enforce. Courts see an issue 
through the distorting prism of a single case (as opposed to a whole program, 
which is how the agency sees the issue).77 It looks to the lay judge as if the 
agency has made a mistake, or even just that the judge can do something 
good for the environment. It is very difficult for a judge to resist the urge to 
use power to do what he or she thinks is right.78 
My mentor, Judge David Bazelon, who was on the D.C. Circuit for 
many years, a wise and caring man and probably one of the judges in 
American history who understood the relationship between law and science 
best, loved paraphrasing Socrates for the proposition that wisdom begins by 
knowing what one does not know.79 It’s very difficult to know what you do 
                                                                                                                            
 73. Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution: Environmental Law and Public 
Health Protection, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10363 (2002). 
 74. BUREAN OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
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 78. Cf. CHARLES BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW: THE 1979 HOLMES LECTURES 17 
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not know. This is the great difficulties in counseling judges who are not 
scientifically literate, much less are not experts in the field, as to how they 
should evaluate whether the scientific evidence supports an agency decision. 
We have tried to address this problem is recent years with better training for 
judges, and a manual on scientific evidence for judges ─ both 
recommendations of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and 
Government,80 with which I worked as a consultant. But I feel we can still 
do better. 
It is not easy to specify what the alternatives might be. A number of 
more expert instrumentalities for purposes of reviewing highly technical and 
scientific decision have been developed worldwide that we could study and 
emulate. I am not advocating that agency decisions should be unreviewable, 
but I think that they should be reviewed by people who are more 
knowledgeable about basic principles of scientific inference. Most judges 
and lawyers in the United States (including myself) have not even taken a 
basic college-level course in statistics, and yet they are deciding whether 
agencies have acted rationally when assessing complex scientific evidence. 
There are admittedly some advantages of courts of general jurisdiction. Bit I 
do favor more specialized courts for reviewing highly technical and 
scientific matters. 
This is not only important to improve the quality of decisions, but also 
to re-define the culture of our regulatory agencies. Our regulatory process is 
too dominated by lawyers and not enough by scientists. As the late 
Georgetown University law professor Steven Goldberg aptly put it: 
“Regulatory agencies are regularly accused of being ‘captured’ by industry, 
consumer groups, members of Congress, or bureaucratic inertia. They are 
never accused, however, of being captured by scientists.”81 Bill Pedersen, 
another fine scholar and former EPA Deputy General Counsel, has made the 
point that the power of the reviewing courts feeds back into nature and 
culture of the agency; lawyers are powerful and even dominant inside our 
agencies at least in part because we use lawyers and lay courts to review 
agency decisions.82 By reducing the power and authority of lay judges to 
overturn agency decisions, we also reduce the relative power and influence 
of lawyers inside agencies.83 At the margins, that would be a good thing. In 
my view, our agencies are too focused on politics and law, and not enough 
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on scientific expertise. 
3. Substance-by-Substance Regulation. Another problem in U.S. 
environmental law is that we generally proceed chemical-by-chemical, 
substance-by-substance, medium-by-medium.84 Ours is a very fragmented 
system with many separate laws relating to the environment; EPA lists 32 
separate ones on its website,85 and that does not consider the procedural 
ones, which are separate, or the many environmental laws administered by 
agencies other than EPA, such as the Department of Interior, and the 
Department of Energy, or the Forest Service (which is part of the 
Department of Agriculture). 
To make matters worse, our courts have not allowed agencies to regulate 
based on categorical judgments by experts in a way that is very common 
throughout Europe and in many other countries. We have implicitly 
assimilated environmental regulations to the model of the criminal trial: is 
this chemical guilty or innocent, and has it had its fair day in court?86 
Because they think that a chemical (or its maker) is on trial and is entitled to 
due process, our courts have held that regulation must be based on individual 
chemical-by-chemical dossiers or “records.” 
A good example of one of the difficulties of the substance-by-substance 
approach is a case called AFL-CIO v. OSHA.87 That is an interesting title: 
AFL-CIO is the largest federation of industrial labor unions in the United 
States and OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, is the 
federal government agency that regulates the workplace. In many countries 
around the world, labor unions have been a strong proponent for tightening 
workplace standards. And that is also true for some unions in the United 
States, but others, sometimes see tough regulatory standards as decreasing 
wages, so they sometimes sue to overturn them in court. 
But the 11th Circuit decision in AFL-CIO v. OSHA in 1992 is right up 
there with Corroson Proof Fittings, the asbestos case that I mentioned 
                                                                                                                            
 84. In recent years, there have been some attempts to break out of this mold, through techniques 
such as “cluster rules” that group together into one consolidated rulemaking various proposed 
regulations under different statutes that all affect a single industry. For example, in 1998, for the first 
time EPA promulgated a “cluster rule” for the pulp and paper industry that included both air and water 
regulations on a consolidated basis, see National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
the Pulp and Paper Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 18504 (Apr. 15, 1998). Another recent trend in the same 
direction is “one stop shopping” permits, which are issued by some of our states in which permits 
under various environmental statutes are issued on a consolidated basis. This is already common in the 
United Kingdom but is just beginning in the United States. 
 85. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Laws that We Administer, http://www.epa.gov/ 
lawsregs/laws/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 86. Denison, supra note 46. 
 87. AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992) (invalidating permissible exposure limits 
for 428 toxic substances for lack of sufficient “individual substance discussions” despite OSHA’s 
argument that it had managed to set only 24 substance-specific standards in its history and that “using 
past approaches . . . it would take decades to review currently used chemicals”). 
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before, as one of my nominees for the worst judicial decision relating to the 
environment in recent American history. Under the first Bush Administration 
(which was supposedly a conservative, moderate, pro-business 
Administration) OSHA set exposure standards for 428 chemical substances 
in the workplace. Now that compares with a total of only 24 standards that 
OSHA had been previously established in its twenty year history. They did 
that by essentially incorporating by reference the expert consensus standards 
that exist around the world. This is approach of relying upon expert 
judgment and consensus is very common in the European Union; it is called 
“comitology.”88 But the U.S. courts reversed that and said “(in essence) no, 
OSHA has to review the facts and literature on each chemical on a 
case-by-case basis.” That they had to go through one-by-one and develop a 
factual record for each individual chemical. The agency was not permitted to 
act based on expert consensus. 
This case exemplifies a very strong part of our legal culture. Where I 
think that we went wrong is that we have wrongly assimilated issues of 
chemical safety or pollution standards to questions of fact rather than 
questions of policy and judgment. Supreme Court decisions have said that 
the support underlying a regulation is a factual issue that must so we have to 
have a record with a factual claim and supported by evidence rather than 
experts making judgments on a science policy basis.89 
There is some hope that new techniques for high throughput testing of 
chemical pathways in human cell lines may eventually help us solve these 
problems.90 
4. Separate Media Programs. Media is what we call air, water, land. At 
our agencies, we divide things up so that we will have separate pollution 
standards, for water and air pollution standards. These programs do not 
always coordinate, and do not always see eye-to-eye. 91  It is a very 
                                                                                                                            
 88. Wikipedia, Comitology, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comitology (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) 
(“Global Village is a term closely associated with Marshall McLuhan”) (as of Sept. 30, 2010, 13:40 
GMT). 
 89. See also Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
119 (2003).  
 90 . COMMITTEE ON TOXICITY TESTING AND ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AGENTS, 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A VISION AND 
A STRATEGY (2007). For a brief accessible summary, see The National Academy of Sciences, Report 
in Brief: Toxicity Testing in the 21st Century: A Vision and Strategy, http://dels.nas.edu/resources/ 
static-assets/materials-based-on-reports/reports-in-brief/Toxicity_Testing_final.pdf (last visited Sept. 
10, 2010) (“The report envisions a new toxicity-testing system that relies mainly on understanding 
“toxicity pathways”—the cellular response pathways that can result in adverse health effects when 
sufficiently perturbed. Such a system would evaluate biologically significant alterations without 
relying on studies of whole animals.”); see also Bret C. Cohen et al., Toxicity Testing in the 21st 
Century: Better Results, Less Use of Animals, ENVIL. F., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 46. 
 91. EPA’s “cluster regulations” serve as a limited attempt to overcome this problem, see Elliott, 
supra note 83. 
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inefficient way to regulate. 
5. Defining Goals. We have not done a very good job of defining the 
goals of our environmental protection programs. That is in part because we 
developed them prior to the 1987 Brundlant Commission92 and the 1992 Rio 
Treaty93  popularized the concept of “sustainable development.” I have 
written articles,94 and even spoken by invitation to the EPA, about trying to 
coordinate the goals of environmental protection in the Untied States with 
the idea of sustainable development worldwide. But instead, we have high 
sounding but essentially meaningless phrases like “protect and enhance the 
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and 
welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”95 
Some feel that statements of goals in our environmental statutes are 
essentially meaningless.96 But I think they are a wasted opportunity. Many 
businesses and other organizations have found is useful to develop “mission 
statements,” as a way of defining what they are about and getting everyone 
coordinated and clear as to the shared objective. I found this to be a very 
useful technique when I was General Counsel of EPA, and we went through 
the process of dialogue to develop a mission statement for the office. That 
helped us to clarify what our role was vis-à-vis other offices. Similarly, for 
reasons that I have argued in detail elsewhere and will not repeat here, I 
think that it would be useful to make “sustainable development” the lodestar 
for our environmental statutes. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSIONS AND RESPONSE 
 
Question (Robin J. Winkler, Attorney, Winkler Partners):  
 
I am wondering if you could talk more about the accessibility to 
information by the public and people who get involved in a lawsuit; that is, 
the accessibility to verifiable reported facility standards. Thank you. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 92. World Commission On Env’t & Dev. [The Brundtland Commission], Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Apr. 20, 
1987) (known as the “Brundtland Commission Report”). 
 93. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 
(entered into force Dec. 29, 1993). 
 94. E. Donald Elliott & Mohamed Tarifi, Integrating Sustainable Development into U.S. Law and 
Business, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10170 (2003). 
 95. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401b-1 (1990). 
 96 . DONALD WORSTER, THE WEALTH OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND THE 
ECOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 142-55 (1993). 
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Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
All of our environmental statutes provide that this type of information 
about releases of pollution have to be reported to regulatory agencies; they 
also provide that it cannot be claimed to be a secret, or unavailable. By law, 
it is made available to anyone who wants it. 
We also have a very successful program called the Toxics Release 
Inventory that requires companies to report and make available information 
to the public regarding their releases of pollution to the environment.97 This 
“TRI” program has been a success in encouraging companies to reduce their 
pollution. Some scholars attribute this success to reputational concerns or the 
“shaming” function.98 EPA Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, 
Gina McCarthy, who has taken part in this program, said recently that EPA’s 
new Greenhouse Gas Reporting rule will do more than merely get 
information; after the information has been made available to the public, 
there will be pressure on the companies to reduce their Greenhouse Gas 
emissions, just as the Toxic Release Inventory has done for other pollutants. 
It is a demonstration of how information can be used as regulatory technique 
in environmental programs,99 as has been done for many years in our 
Securities Laws.100 
As to the process for setting facility standards, it is generally done 
through the so-called Cooperative Federalism System.101 First, the federal 
government sets the standards at a general level; then each individual state is 
obliged to produce its own comprehensive plans to meet the federal targets. 
It is very similar in some way to the process in the European Union, which is 
called the Concept of Subsidiarity.102 The EU issues a directive to pose an 
obligation on member states to pass through their own legislations. The 
actual standards taken can vary on a state-by-state basis, but there also exists 
certain typical rule-setting processes; that is, the so-called informal 
                                                                                                                            
 97. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Toxics Release Inventory Program, http://www.epa. 
gov/tri/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 98. Mary Graham, Regulation by Shaming, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2000, at 36, available 
at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2000/04/graham.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 99. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001) (arguing that “TRI is a 
watershed, pioneering the systematic use of performance monitoring and benchmarking”). 
 100. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 
(2001). 
 101. E.g. Sarah E. Leatherwood, States Take the Wheel—Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth 
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie Gives States a Chance to Choose the Direction of Their Automobile Emissions 
Regulation, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 669, 687 (2008) (providing a successful example of Automobile Air 
Pollution Regulation in the Cooperative Federalism System). 
 102. Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 18 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 616 (1994) (examining the application and compatibility of the principle of subsidiarity to 
the European Community). 
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rule-making processes. The localities are certainly free to regulate more 
stringently than what federal law requires, but not less, for the EPA would 
review again whether the state laws are of adequate compliance with the 
federal standard. 
 
Robin J. Winkler (Attorney, Winkler Partners): 
 
In my personal experience as a participant in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Commission of the EPA in Taiwan for two years, and an 
environmental NGO, we have difficulties to obtain complete and accurate 
information from the Taiwan EPA concerning their permits; some are even 
basic data. I am curious that in the United States, if companies do not report 
relevant information on their proceedings, how the information could be 
made available to the public. 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
This is absolutely not a problem in the United States, as far as I know. 
The obligation to report is a separate legal obligation with legal effects such 
as fines and penalties, if anyone fails to comply. For example, when a person 
goes into a local environmental agency to ask to see the discharge 
monitoring reports from a certain company, and the agency cannot provide 
it, because the company has not yet made its report; then the person can sue 
the company that failed to report because they violated the law. The citizen 
is not dependent on the local agency, but can sue the violator directly. 
In addition, the 1990 Amendments of Clean Air Act has made it a 
criminal offence for a designated person at a company, who fails to report or 
reports falsely. 103  In order to make the law enforceable we had to 
personalize it; that is, the designated person at a company, usually the plant 
manager, is responsible personally for reporting and is subject to criminal 
sanctions for his/her failure to conform with the law. This approach was 
adopted by analogy to our income tax form reporting laws. In the United 
States when a tax form is signed, whether it was properly understood or not, 
the signer has the obligation to assure its correctness.  
In the occasional instances of dishonesty, where people falsify their 
reports, they are taken seriously by both political parties and brought as 
criminal cases and people are sent to jail.104 
 
                                                                                                                            
 103. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413c (1990). 
 104. See, e.g., Department of Justice, Former Oklahoma Official Sentenced for Concealing 
Violations of Safe Drinking Water Act, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-enrd- 
1032.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
168 National Taiwan University Law Review [Vol. 5: 2 
Question: Could you talk more about the opt-in provisions? 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
Initially, our Acid Rain Trading Program only required “electric 
generating units” (powerplants) to reduce their emissions of sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) pollution.105 However, other sources, like smelters, also produce the 
same pollution, but could potentially control their emission much more 
cost-effectively. I wanted to include certain industrial resources under the 
system at first, but what was decided instead was to allow the owners of 
individual industrial facilities to “choose” to come under the program—the 
so-called opt-in system.106 They would come into the system if they could 
reduce their pollution cheaply and sell allowances to others. Some of them 
could make money by reducing their pollution. When those industry owners, 
who manage to control pollution more cheaply, choose to enter the trading 
system, that reduces the cost overall of meeting the system-wide cap. Instead 
of regulating solely with force and threats, the government can also provide 
positive incentives in terms of financial rewards. If an industry creates a 
new, less expensive way to control pollution development and consents to 
opt into the system, it can use that technology to obtain allowances that it 
can sell to others to offset their pollution. A company with better method of 
controlling SO2 pollution than other electric utilities can enter into a private 
contract, selling its allowances, or rights, to the other electric utilities. The 
whole community still achieve the same amount of pollution control overall. 
To conclude, two benefits can be derived from such a program. First is 
lower cost for pollution reduction and second is a dynamic 
technology-improving incentive on a consensual basis.  
 
Question (Robin J. Winkler, Attorney, Winkler Partners): 
 
In the United States, when the scope of environmental law enforcements 
is so vast that a small number of people working in the EPA are hardly able 
to carry them out effectively, citizens’ participation helps hold up the 
system. If this understanding is correct, then, what is the general attitude of 
EPA towards citizen suits in the United States? How do they view 
environmental groups, for example Earth Justice and Earth Rights, which 
                                                                                                                            
 105. The overall goal of the Acid Rain Program is to achieve significant environmental and 
public health benefits through reductions in emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx)—the primary causes of acid rain. The task of the program and its related information could be 
found at its website: Acid Rain Program, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/arp/index.html (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 106. Opting into the Acid Rain Program, 60 C.F.R. 17100 (Apr. 4, 1995). 
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bring suits against the leaders, or against the EPA in order to force them to 
take actions? 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
It is difficult to speak for the EPA as a whole, but I think in general they 
would welcome these groups as friends. This is also true of court decision 
forcing the agency to take action. A common problem in government is 
avoiding or deferring a controversial decision “for further study.”  
Most people who work for EPA, and most environmentalists share 
common values and believe strongly in protecting the environment. EPA 
officials, however, as part of the government, can sometimes find their goal 
to protect the environment gets traded off or compromised with other goals 
and social values. Therefore, a suit or court decision imposing obligations on 
the government to obey the law, more often than not, is welcomed and 
considered positive by EPA. They are often happy, even though they “lost” 
the case, because it makes them do what they really wanted to do anyway. 
 
Professor Jiunn-rong Yeh:  
 
Following what professor Elliot said about “global context,” the 
adoption of environmental standing in citizen suits in Taiwan is another 
interesting example. The reason why Taiwan’s EPA was able to agree upon 
introducing that system involves some sort of institutional context behind the 
scene. In the area of environmental law enforcement, there has always been 
a conflict between the national government and local governments. In 
Taiwan, it is up to local governments to actually enforce environmental laws. 
However in some occasions, a local government drags their feet because of 
some political concerns, which seems unacceptable to the national EPA. 
Citizen groups preparing to sue the local government may come in handy in 
these situations, thus welcomed by the national EPA.  
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
Typically, an environmental standard in the United States is enforceable 
in three ways: by the federal government, by state governments, and by 
citizen suits in courts. This reflects the characteristic American suspicion of 
government. We do not believe that governments can always be counted on 
to do the right things, so we need multiple mechanisms to make sure that 
laws are enforced. Very similar to the situation in Taiwan that some state 
agencies in the United States are perceived to be under political pressure 
from locally powerful political forces, so sometimes states prefer the federal 
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EPA to enforce the rules. In cases where neither the federal EPA nor the 
states are going to enforce the rules, then citizen suits by environmental 
groups can be counted on to enforce the law. 
 
Question: In civil-law countries, before any citizen can bring a case against 
the government in a court, he has to go through an administrative appeal 
procedure; whereas in the United States, there must be exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. Does such an appeal system exist in the United 
States? Do you think such existence good or bad? 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies at the federal 
level came from judge-made law. There is no requirement for exhaustion of 
administrative remedies under the federal Administrative Procedure Act 
unless required by some other statute or rule,107 but there is an explicit 
requirement for exhaustion of administrative remedies under the model state 
administrative procedure act.108 However, in terms of citizen-suit, a very 
brief mechanism of giving notice, in lieu of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, can be found in most environmental statutes. 109  In the 
enforcement type of citizen suits, before a person can bring a lawsuit, they 
must give advance notice to the interested party such as the polluter who is 
violating the law. This gives them one last chance to acknowledge and 
correct their mistakes and get into compliance. This procedure of giving 
notice that a lawsuit is soon to follow often makes it unnecessary to go 
through court proceedings. On receiving a notice letter, the polluter knows 
that a lawsuit is likely to follow within 30 or 60 days, so they often decide to 
correct their failures and get into compliance in order to make the lawsuit 
unnecessary. 
 
Question: In Taiwan and the United States, citizen suit clauses are provided 
in separate different environmental laws. In Taiwan, when several citizens 
tried to save some historical buildings, they failed, because there is no 
                                                                                                                            
 107. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993) (“Federal courts do not have the authority to require 
a plaintiff to exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial review under the APA, 
where neither the relevant statute nor agency rules specifically mandate exhaustion as a prerequisite to 
judicial review.”); see generally Raoul Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YALE L.J. 
981 (1938). 
 108. Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 5-107 (1981) (“A person may file a petition for 
judicial review under this Act only after exhausting all administrative remedies available with the 
agency […].”). 
 109. See generally Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L. 
REV. 339, 351-66 (1990). 
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citizen suit clause in our Cultural Heritage Preservation Act.110 My question 
is whether it is possible in the future that the citizen suit clause will also be 
adopted in other areas of law. 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
Section 553e of Administrative Procedure Act,111 which was adopted in 
1946, is a good reference here. This provision allows any interested person 
to petition to a government agency to make a rule. If the government agency 
turns it down or fails to act within a reasonable period of time, the petitioner 
can go to court and sue. Here, both “a government’s decision to act” and 
“not to act” are made subject to judicial review. And this general provision 
in administrative law extends beyond environmental issues. 
Another more complicated provision concerning enforcement is called 
“qui-tam,” which was originally from old common law and later codified in 
a statute.112 Any practice by a company, which results in short-changing, or 
not giving government the full benefit, can be subject to a third-party’s 
action to recover the government’s loss, and the third-party is able to get a 
portion of recovery from the suit. 
 
Question (Robin J. Winkler, Attorney, Winkler Partners):  
 
Could you talk more about the “standing” you mentioned earlier, as well 
as the concept of “interested parties”? Is it true that most of the 
environmental laws are not enforced, unless citizens have initiated a suit? 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
No. There are actually different kinds of enforcement, and we use the 
word “enforcement” in an ambiguous way in English. Enforcement can refer 
both to forcing companies to comply with pollution standards, as well as 
making the EPA promulgate a new rule upon a line that is required by the 
Congress. Both kinds can trigger citizen suits. There is an abundance of 
citizen suits about enforcement, but also a great deal of enforcement by both 
federal and state agencies as well.  
With regard to the concept of standing and “interested parties,” which is 
very complicated, there are two dimensions: statutory and constitutional. 
When environmental laws were drafted in the 1970s, according to the 
statutes, Congress allowed virtually anyone to sue. However, in the 1980s, 
                                                                                                                            
 110. Wenhua Tzuchan Paotsunfa [Cultural Heritage Preservation Act] (2005) (Taiwan). 
 111. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553e (1946). 
 112. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730d (1994). 
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the Supreme Court said that constitutionally Congress could not give citizens 
rights to sue unless they met certain limited standards on a constitutional 
level. A recent case decided by the Supreme Court, Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw, 113  applies the constitutional standard in the context of 
environmental law. It is basically regarded as a liberal opinion written by 
Justice Ginsburg and it essentially provides that anybody claiming to use the 
resource only needs to prove his/her concern due to an environmental 
violation. It is distinguished from a case decided a few years earlier, where 
some people tried to sue about the Endangered Species Act in order to 
protect tigers in India.114 These people never lived in India, but they claimed 
that they might at some point in the future go to India and visit the tigers, but 
the court held the chain of causation was too long. That is usually not an 
issue for the enforcement of environmental standards. It is also important to 
know that the standing requirement only applies to the ability to go to court, 
but not to government agencies. 
 
Question: Citizen suits rely very much on a strong civil society and it takes a 
lot of resources to bring a case before the court. If we do not have a strong 
civil society or nongovernment organizations (NGOs), do you think it is 
appropriate for the government to support a citizen suit system? 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
The strong civil society of environmental groups in the United States 
was created rather explicitly by Senator Edmund Muskie, who was the main 
author of most of our environmental laws. Muskie explicitly intended to 
create incentives and roles for environmental groups in the statutes, and their 
success is a good example that in designing statutes we should create a role 
that private actors can play under these statutes. By creating the roles of 
those groups under the statutes, we created something important for groups 
to do, and thereby they became more powerful and able to attract more 
members to do even more. Creating an institutional structure, in which there 
is something important for private groups to do, is a way to develop 
powerful environmental groups. 
 
Question (Cheng-Yi Huang, Assistant Research Professor, Academia 
Sinica):  
 
Here let me cast some doubts on the best side of quantitative risk 
                                                                                                                            
 113. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 114. Lujan v. Defender of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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assessment. Among all of the existing attacks on cost-benefit analysis, one of 
them is from your colleague at Yale Law School, Dan M. Kahan, who 
proposed a cultural cognitive approach to risk assessment.115 But what he 
proposed also brings up a very difficult problem particularly on economic 
cost-and-benefit analysis. I wonder if you could comment on those tests built 
on cost-benefit analysis and what alternatives we could have.  
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
It is a great question. In the United States, we have both liability and 
regulatory systems. The notion is that when we are observing a problem, it is 
better to see it from two different directions than only from one. There is a 
huge literature telling us how intuitive human decisions do not work out very 
well sometimes. Risk assessment can be regarded as a compensation for that, 
especially for the kinds of fears that Cass Sunstein has also discussed.116  
Many civil jury cases are decided based upon Kahan’s intuitive sense of 
decision-making and might be considered to be wrong in terms of 
cost-benefit analysis, or quantitative risk assessment. 
I do not favor one to the exclusion of the other. Instead, I favor 
maintaining both, because they complement one another. Our system has 
quantitative risk assessment and instrumental rationality through government 
regulatory and administrative decision making. It is enhanced by also having 
more intuitive jury-based or community-based approach of decision-making. 
 
Question: According to a very interesting article published on The New 
Republic, the author reviewed the number of non-expert administrators 
nominated into George W. Bush administration. When a risk assessment, 
which relies on scientific findings or statistic analysis, was brought in a case 
before a court, we always worry about the judges as non-experts to review 
the experts’ decisions. However, when the regulators or the administrators 
are also non-experts, does it help a judge to review the case, or decide a 
policy? 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
I do not agree with the idea that courts should automatically defer to 
political appointees on grounds of scientific expertise. 117  The most 
                                                                                                                            
 115. Dan M. Kahan et al., Book Review, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein 
on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006). 
 116 . See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE (2005). 
 117. E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at EPA, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 
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important thing is obviously to get good people into the government. It is 
virtually impossible to design a system, which is able to function well, 
without good, highly motivated, intelligent people. But I agree with you that 
courts should not be deferring to non-experts on grounds of scientific 
expertise. To fix this problem, I have proposed that the opinions by the 
scientist advisors inside agencies should become part of the record for 
judicial review.118 Thus when the administration does not want to follow the 
recommendations by the scientists, it has to explain why not. 
 
Question: Speaking of science reports being subject to judicial review, I 
think in Taiwan’s environmental law practice, we would face at least two 
problems of that. One is a technical one, resulting from the court’s lack of 
scientific knowledge and support; the other is whether any legal basis exists 
for the court to do so. 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
The core problem underlying this issue came when the Supreme Court 
decided the Benzene case in 1980 and assimilated questions of scientific 
support for regulations to questions of fact rather than judgments about 
policy.119 We need a more realistic appraisal of how far science can really 
answer these questions. Science is helpful to frame the issues, but it rarely 
fully answers the questions that a regulator faces, so some element of a 
policy judgment is also necessary.120 
 
Question (Hsin-Tien Chen, College of Law, National Taiwan University): 
 
According to a few articles I have read, some scholars mentioned that 
there are some climate change litigations emerging and many of them were 
at state courts while a few were in federal circuit courts. In the United States, 
especially on climate change issue, does state government have the chance to 
take precedence to regulate or to form strategies to control the situations? Or 
do they take the initiate and make certain influence on the federal 
government’s decision to act? 
 
                                                                                                                            
51 (2003) (“It seems bizarre that courts must defer to an EPA decision based on the Agency’s alleged 
scientific ‘expertise’ if all the scientists at the Agency opposed the decision on the science but were 
overruled by the politicians.”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Indus. Union Dept. v. Amer. Petrol. Insti., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
 120. Charnley & Elliott, supra note 73, at 10363-10364 (“By overemphasizing the factual 
component of risk assessment, U.S. appellate courts misunderstand the nature of risk assessment and 
undervalue expert judgment and policy considerations.”). 
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Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
This is a very good point. About half of our states have already taken 
action on climate change, usually through trading systems. Many of the 
federal bills pending in Congress would “preempt” or replace state actions. 
In an article, which Bruce Ackerman, John Millian and I wrote in 1985,121 
we argued that there are many industries that sell products in many different 
states that need federal legislation to set uniform standards; they actually 
prefer to federal legislation to clarify the standards.122 Jody Freeman, who 
was then a climate advisor at the White House and is now back to her 
professorship at Harvard Law School, once said that something similar is 
happening with climate change: the process of state regulation and 
regulation through court decisions will eventually cause industries to prefer a 
trading system at the federal level. But I think it is going to take longer than 
many people think because of the current economic conditions in the United 
States, which is unfavorable to major new environmental initiatives. 
 
Question: Climate change is not only a scientific, but also a political and 
economical issue. Since Taiwan did not have the opportunity to sign the 
Kyoto Protocol and play a role on the global stage, to avoid being excluded 
from this global participation, do you have any suggestions for Taiwan to 
come up to face or participate in this climate change framework? 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
Despite the formal status of Taiwan in the international community, 
which is a very difficult topic, I think Taiwan plays a very important regional 
role in Asia. Taiwan is able to exercise moral leadership in the same way that 
Europeans do. Taiwan could join the Copenhagen Accord on its own 
initiative and simply announce its intent to comply with the Accord.123 We 
should not confuse the formal question on the status of Taiwan with the 
question of Taiwan participating in developing an international 
environmental consensus. 
                                                                                                                            
 121. E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory 
Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).  
 122. Id. at 330. 
 123. See Taiwan Initiates Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, http://unfccc.epa.gov.tw/ 
unfccc/english/_uploads/20100901/B5-NAMAs_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2010) (“An official letter 
to the UNFCCC Secretariat signed by Dr. Stephen Shu-Hung Shen, Minister of Taiwan EPA explicitly 
indicated Taiwan’s support of the Copenhagen Accord with a voluntary commitment to the target of at 
least 30% reduction based on business-as-usual (BAU) of the total GHG emission volume by 2020.”). 
More than 100 countries have joined the Copenhagen Accord, see John M. Broder, China and India 
Join Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/world/10 
climate.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
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Question (Chun-Yuen Lin, College of Law, National Taiwan University): 
 
My question is about the interaction between international law and 
American environmental law, especially on the occasion of climate change. 
Since international treaties are also making regulations on those issues, do 
you think this global development is actually affecting the formation of the 
type of American environmental law with regard to climate change? Or, is it 
the other way around that American environmental law may make 
contributions to the international environmental law? 
 
Professor E. Donald Elliott: 
 
What is taking place now is that we are really forming a truly global 
environmental law for the first time. One of the difficulties we are facing is 
the various legal cultures in different countries. For example, it is commonly 
held in the United States that China is doing nothing about climate change, 
but I came to realize that is a misunderstanding after I became involved with 
environmental policies in China and learned that China is actually doing 
quite a lot.124 They are simply doing it in a different way because they have 
a different legal system, which is not fully recognized or understood by some 
people other countries. If China has a major five-year plan to increase energy 
efficiency and reduce the CO2 impact each year, which is not a typical 
American cap-and-trade or a regulatory system, so people in the United 
States do not necessarily recognize it. It is similar that when we are reducing 
CO2 emission by means other than federal or state legislation, people say we 
are “doing nothing.” 
Right now we are in an interesting stage, where every country does 
fairly well in terms of what it has defined as “the environment” in terms of 
its values and culture. For example, we might think of India as a terribly 
polluted country, but one time one of my colleagues, who came from India, 
told me that India had the best environmental practice than any other county 
in the world, since they had the lowest energy consumption and lowest green 
house gas production per unit of production of any other country in the 
world.125 By that measure, India had done better than anyone else. Different 
countries have different cultural backgrounds behind the ways they deal with 
environmental issues, and they also define the essence of environment in 
different ways. I think we are now at a stage, where we are only beginning to 
                                                                                                                            
 124. Dongsheng Zang, From Environment to Energy: China’s Reconceptualization of Climate 
Change, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 543 (2009). 
 125. Keren Priyadarshini & Omprakash K. Gupta, Compliance to Environmental Regulations: 
The Indian Context, 2 INT’L J. BUS. & ECON. 9 (2003) (discussing how the companies in India comply 
with the environmental regulations). 
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be able to talk past these cultural barriers. 
 
Professor Jiunn-rong Yeh:  
 
Thank you very much for your interesting speech, Professor Elliott, and 
thank you too for all those stimulating remarks. Those who had the privilege 
to join all three lectures that Professor Elliot was able to deliver, as I did, 
must have realized that the reason for Professor Elliott’s great influence in 
this field as an environmental law professor and expert, was his ability to 
master not only environmental law doctrines, but the knowledge in 
administrative law, regulatory policy theories, science, and even the most 
basic understanding of legal culture and jurisprudence. From these three 
lectures, we see a holistic and a broad view about law, instead of a very 
narrow construction of legal dogmatic understandings. This is a very 
important role model to Taiwan, both in terms of legal education and legal 
practice. We have too many lawyers devoted themselves in the field of 
traditional property or liability suits, but we are actually in greater need of 
environmental lawyers with the same as what Professor Elliott has shown us 
today, or even more, strong basis of knowledge to lead greater influence. 
Take the case of Taitung Beautiful Bay for example.126 After years of 
silence, some of our friends and lawyers finally made a breakthrough by 
bringing the case to the court and they made the best use of citizen suit 
clause. Their victory is enough to be ranked the most exciting development 
in Taiwan about environmental law in recent years. And their influence is 
also spreading to other issues. In all of these areas of environmental law, it is 
a challenge as well as an opportunity for us to come forward with better than 
ever legal inventions.  
                                                                                                                            
 126. Gaushiung Gaodeng Shingjeng Fayuan [Gaushiung Admin. High Ct.], 96 Su No. 647 (2008) 
(Taiwan); Jiunn-rong Yeh, Tsung Kungmin Susung tao Huanching Fayuen: Huanching Kungmin 
Susung yu Taiwan te Shihchien yu Chientao [From Citizen Suits to Environmental Court: The Practice 
and Reflections on the Environmental Citizen Suits in Taiwan] 25 (Dec. 6, 2008) (unpublished article, 
on file with College of Law, National Taiwan University). 
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